Informative experimentation in intuitive science: Children select and learn from their own causal interventions. by Lapidow, Elizabeth & Walker, Caren M
UC San Diego
UC San Diego Previously Published Works
Title
Informative experimentation in intuitive science: Children select and learn from their own 
causal interventions.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9r43n3rk
Authors
Lapidow, Elizabeth
Walker, Caren M
Publication Date
2020-05-17
DOI
10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104315
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Cognition
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cognit
Informative experimentation in intuitive science: Children select and learn
from their own causal interventions
Elizabeth Lapidow⁎, Caren M. Walker
Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, United States of America
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Cognitive development
Causal learning
Exploration
Scientific reasoning
Decision-making
Causal interventions
A B S T R A C T
We investigated whether children preferentially select informative actions and make accurate inferences from
the outcome of their own interventions in a causal learning task. Four- to six-year-olds were presented with a
novel system composed of gears that could operate according to two possible causal structures (single or multiple
cause). Given the choice between interventions (i.e., removing one of the two gears to observe the remaining
gear in isolation), children demonstrated a clear preference for the action that revealed the true causal structure,
and made subsequent causal judgments that were consistent with the outcome observed. Experiment 2 addressed
the possibility that performance was driven by children's tendency to select an intervention that would produce a
desirable effect (i.e., spinning gears), rather than to disambiguate the causal structure. These results replicate our
initial findings in a context in which the informative action was less likely to produce a positive outcome than
the uninformative one. Experiment 3 serves as a control demonstrating that children's success in the previous
experiments is not due to their use of low-level strategies. We discuss these findings in terms of their significance
for understanding the development of scientific reasoning and the role of self-directed actions in early causal
learning.
1. Introduction
The concept of the learner as an intuitive scientist—forming and
evaluating hypotheses about the world—has provided an illuminating
and productive model for understanding the mechanisms underlying
cognitive development. In particular, ‘theory theorists’ have long ad-
vanced an analogy between formal scientific theory change and the
processes underlying knowledge acquisition. Like scientific theories,
children's intuitive theories are formulated, tested, and rationally re-
vised in a way that combines their existing knowledge with new evi-
dence (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). Indeed, much of what we know
about self-directed learning in early childhood (and beyond) appears to
resemble the basic inductive processes of science. From infancy, lear-
ners register and perceive statistical regularities in the data they ob-
serve (i.e., “intuitive statistics”, Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Sobel
& Kirkham, 2006; Xu & Garcia, 2008), and preschool-aged children use
such regularities to infer abstract causal theories that allow for ex-
planation and prediction of events in the world (e.g., Carey, 1985; Keil,
1989; Wellman & Gelman, 1992).
However, the scientific process is not limited to observation and
interpretation of data available in the environment. Similarly, intuitive
science requires designing, selecting, and executing actions to evaluate
the accuracy of one's currently held beliefs and acquire new knowledge.
This need for informative experimentation is especially apparent in the
domain of causal inference, as observation alone is often insufficient to
determine the dependencies that exist among variables in the world.
Instead, observations must typically be paired with appropriate and
informative investigations in order to disambiguate between potential
causes or causal structures (Pearl, 2000). To illustrate, suppose that you
notice that the houseplant sitting in a sunny spot on the windowsill has
wilted, and the soil in the planter is dry. Multiple causal structures are
consistent with this pattern of observation (see Fig. 1): It could be that
the intense sunlight dried out the soil, and the plants wilted due to the
lack of moisture (a causal chain, Fig. 1a). Or perhaps this is a variety of
plant that requires shade, regardless of moisture. In this case, the sun-
light is a direct cause of both wilting and dry soil, independently of one
another (a common cause, Fig. 1b).
While passive observation of the world cannot disambiguate be-
tween these two possibilities on its own, an intervention, or action that
fixes the value of a single variable, can: If variable X is the cause of
variable Y, then, intervening to change X will also lead to a change in Y
(i.e., the conditional intervention principle, Woodward, 2003). Re-
turning to our houseplant example, you could intervene to change the
dryness of the soil—perhaps by watering more often—and then check
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to see if the plants in that location flourish (indicating a causal chain,
Fig. 1a) or continue to wilt (indicating a common cause, Fig. 1b). Ex-
perimentation is therefore a powerful tool for determining causal
structure, but its usefulness critically requires that the learner recognize
and carry out informative interventions. For example, while intervening
on the sunlight (e.g., by shading the planter) will always improve the
health of the plant, this desirable outcome would not provide in-
formation about the true underlying causal structure (i.e., whether
wilting was caused by dry soil or by excess sunlight).
Whether young learners are able to engage in this type of systematic
experimentation is a subject of substantial debate. On the one hand,
research on exploratory play suggests that around preschool-age, chil-
dren have an intuitive tendency to produce informative actions that
facilitate their learning. For example, 4- to- 6-year-olds preferentially
explore where they have incomplete or inconsistent knowledge (e.g.,
Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, & Schulz, 2012; Gweon & Schulz, 2008;
Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007) and spontaneously select actions with the
potential to improve their epistemic status (Cook, Goodman, & Schulz,
2011; van Schijndel, Visser, van Bers, & Raijmakers, 2015).
On the other hand, this work contrasts with decades of research on
the development of scientific reasoning, which overwhelmingly reports
that even much older, school-aged children do not follow the principles
of informative scientific experimentation in their spontaneous actions
(Zimmerman, 2007; Zimmerman & Klahr, 2018). Specifically, 7- to-12-
year-olds tend to struggle with the control and isolation of variables,
often designing confounded and confirmatory experiments rather than
logically informative ones (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Klahr, Fay, &
Dunbar, 1993; Siler & Klahr, 2012; Valanides, Papageorgiou, & Angeli,
2014). Critically, children in these studies appear to select interventions
based on their tangible outcomes, rather than their informativeness (e.g.,
Kuhn & Phelps, 1982; Schauble, 1990; Schauble, Glaser, Duschl,
Schulze, & John, 1995; Siler & Klahr, 2012; Siler, Klahr, & Price, 2013;
Tschirgi, 1980; Zimmerman & Glaser, 2001). That is, children often
choose actions that will increase the likelihood of a desirable effect, but
cannot disambiguate between the possible causal structures (e.g.,
choosing to shade the planter in Fig. 1).
This apparent preoccupation with producing (or reproducing) po-
sitive outcomes, rather than testing causal hypotheses, has led some
researchers to suggest that young children do not understand the goal of
scientific experimentation (e.g., Carey, Evans, Honda, Jay, & Unger,
1989; Schauble, Klopfer, & Raghavan, 1991). Instead, Schauble et al.
(1991) proposed that early experimentation is motivated by an ‘en-
gineering’ goal, in which children engage in exploratory interventions in
order to “make things happen,” rather than the ‘science’ goal of de-
termining the underlying causal structure of the world. According to
this theory, young learners' interventions are often uninformative be-
cause information is not their goal. Indeed, this explanation has persisted
as a common framework for understanding choice behavior in early
scientific reasoning (e.g., Masnick, Klahr, & Knowles, 2017; Siler et al.,
2013; Siler & Klahr, 2012; Zimmerman, 2007).
If true, this inability or unwillingness to conduct informative
experiments poses a major complication for the claim that children's
self-directed learning intuitively follows a scientific process. The cur-
rent study therefore seeks to determine whether young children select
and make inferences from their own actions in a way that supports their
causal learning. While it is clear from past research that even infants
successfully infer causal relations from observing the outcomes of in-
terventions selected and performed by others (e.g. Meltzoff, Waismeyer,
& Gopnik, 2012), there is conflicting evidence about whether the same
is true for actions that children take themselves.
For example, while Schulz, Gopnik, and Glymour (2007) provide
evidence that 3- to 6-year-olds understand the conditional relationship
between an experimenter's actions and the causal structure of a novel
system, recent findings indicate that even older children (5- to 8-year-
olds) may struggle to apply this principle when planning and inter-
preting their own actions. Schulz et al. (2007) presented children with a
causal system consisting of a toy with an on-off switch and two inter-
locking gears (A and B). Critically, observation of both gears spinning is
insufficient for determining the underlying causal structure (e.g., a
causal chain in which gear A turns gear B vs. a causal chain in which
gear B turns gear A). As in the previous houseplant example, the only
way to determine the causal structure is to carry out informative in-
terventions (in this case, by removing and replacing individual gears to
observe whether they spin in isolation). The authors found that young
learners were able to identify the correct causal structure after obser-
ving the outcomes of an experimenter's interventions on the gears, and
predict the outcomes of interventions in cases when the causal structure
was already known.
In contrast, McCormack, Bramley, Frosch, Patrick, and Lagnado
(2016) and Meng, Bramley, and Xu (2018) found that children have
difficulty producing informative interventions and making causal in-
ferences in exploratory and forced-choice contexts. Both studies pre-
sented children with a causal system composed of three variables (e.g.,
lightbulbs arranged on a circuit board), with two (Meng et al., 2018) or
three (McCormack et al., 2016) competing hypotheses for how they are
causally connected. Children were then given the opportunity to in-
tervene in order to determine the correct hypothesis. While some of the
actions children produced were informative, neither team found evi-
dence of a strong preference for informative actions. According to
McCormack et al. (2016), only 7- and 8-year-olds selected informative
interventions significantly more often than chance, while 5- and 6-year-
olds did not. Meng et al. (2018) report similar failure in 5- to 7-year-
olds. Instead, both studies found evidence that children (across ages)
select interventions in accordance with a positive testing strategy
(PTS)—that is, they took actions that were expected to produce an ef-
fect if their current hypothesis were correct (Coenen, Rehder, &
Gureckis, 2015; Klayman & Ha, 1987). According to McCormack et al.
(2016), the most popular intervention was to intervene on the hy-
pothesized ‘root node’—the variable that was expected to activate the
remaining two, regardless of the true causal structure of the system.
Meng et al. (2018) provide further evidence that although children's
intervention choices rely on a combination of expected information
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Fig. 1. Two possible causal structures for the same three variables: a causal chain (1a) and a common cause (1b).
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gain and PTS, this mix is heavily skewed towards PTS (see Nussenbaum
et al. (2019) for evidence of how the relative mix of strategies sys-
tematically changes across adolescence).
Importantly, evidence for PTS is not evidence against the ‘en-
gineering goal’ account: While activating the putative root node of a
system positively tests the largest number of causal links within it (see
Coenen et al., 2015), this is also the action that ‘makes the most things
happen’. Indeed, within the scientific reasoning literature, PTS beha-
viors are often treated as evidence that young learners are focused
exclusively on the tangible outcomes of their interventions (Tschirgi,
1980; Zimmerman, 2007; Zimmerman & Glaser, 2001). This limited
success documented in previous studies cannot rule out the possibility
that young children primarily select interventions according to an
‘engineering,’ rather than a ‘scientific’ goal. Thus, our first aim is to look
directly at children's intervention preferences. Specifically, we ask
whether young learners will privilege an informative action (i.e., one
that has the potential to disambiguate between competing causal
structures) over an uninformative one in a forced-choice design. Then,
we examine whether children maintain their preference when this un-
informative alternative is guaranteed to produce a desirable effect.
Our second aim is to examine whether children can utilize the
outcomes of their own actions in later causal inference. Despite being
older than the majority of children tested by Schulz et al. (2007),
participants in Meng et al. (2018) failed to identify the correct causal
structure more often than predicted by chance, and the 5- to 6-year-olds
in McCormack et al. (2016) did so only for certain types of structures
(i.e., for common cause, but not causal chain). It remains unclear
whether children's previously reported failure to identify the correct
causal structure was due to their inability to make inferences from self-
generated evidence or due to the challenges associated with these more
complex problems. Indeed, Frosch, McCormack, Lagnado, and Burns
(2012) found that children struggle to make correct inferences about a
similar 3-variable causal system even when an experimenter generated
the necessary evidence for them. We therefore designed the current task
as a modified version of Schulz et al.'s (2007) paradigm. This is a
context in which we know that young learners are able to reason about
the conditional relationship between intervention and causal structure.
The current research goes beyond this prior work to directly ex-
amine whether young children preferentially select and make in-
ferences from their own actions in a way that is sensitive to the in-
formative value of causal intervention. Three experiments examine how
4- to 6-year-olds respond to a forced choice between an informative and
uninformative intervention in a causal learning task. Experiment 1 asks
whether children will preferentially choose to take the informative in-
tervention when selecting actions on a novel causal system. Then, in
Experiment 2, the uninformative intervention is also guaranteed to
produce a desirable effect. Choice behavior on this second task will
therefore illuminate whether children's early interventions are pri-
marily motivated by a ‘science’ or ‘engineering’ goal. Finally, Experiment
3 serves as a critical control to test whether children's interventions and
inferences are truly indicative of their causal understanding. In addition
to looking at which interventions young learners choose (and why),
each of these experiments will also consider whether children are able
to draw accurate inferences about a causal system from evidence they
generate themselves.
2. Experiment 1
To investigate whether children preferentially choose interventions
that support their causal learning, we used a task modeled on Schulz
et al. (2007). Children were introduced to a gear toy featuring two
interlocking gears and a switch. They learned that individual gears
might be “working” (i.e., they spin when the toy is turned on) or
“broken” (i.e., they are inert and prevent any interlocking gears from
spinning). At test, children observed a pair of gears that failed to spin
when the toy was turned on. Children were told that this event could
have resulted from two possible causal structures.1 Either both gears are
broken (a ‘multiple causes’ structure), or one gear is broken, preventing
the other from spinning (a ‘single cause’ structure) (see Fig. 2c). As in
the previous houseplant example (Fig. 1), it is impossible to determine
which of these represents the true causal structure from observation
alone. Instead, a specific informative action must be performed: re-
moving the gear that is broken in both structures and observing the
behavior of the remaining gear in isolation. Because the remaining gear
behaves differently under the competing hypotheses, this observation
uniquely provides information that disambiguates the causal structure.
In contrast, removing the gear that varies between the two structures
and observing the remaining (broken) gear in isolation would result in
the same behavior under both causal structures and provide no new
information.
Critically, children were given a choice between isolating and ob-
serving only one of the two gears prior to making an inference. If young
learners indeed recognize and privilege actions that are most in-
formative for causal learning, then they should prefer to observe the
informative gear. Afterwards, children were given the opportunity to
observe the outcome of their chosen action, and were asked to judge
which of the two structures was correct. If children are able to infer
causal structure from their own actions, then those who select the in-
formative action should also make an accurate inference.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Forty-eight 4- to 6-year-old children (24 female,M= 64.19 months,
SD= 9.46 months, range = 46–82 months) participated in Experiment
1. The target sample size was determined using Cohen's h with a
medium effect size (h = 0.5), and an alpha of 0.05. The sample needed
to achieve a power of 0.80 (N = 32) was increased to accommodate
complete counterbalancing. Children were recruited and tested in-
dividually at a local science museum in a primarily urban area.
Seventeen additional children were tested, but excluded due to ex-
perimenter error (n = 4), machine malfunction (n = 7), or failing to
complete the entire testing session (n = 6). Parents provided written
informed consent and participants gave verbal assent prior to beginning
all procedures.
2.1.2. Materials
The task used a custom-built electronic gear toy, colored plastic
gears, and picture cards with colored illustrations representing the
gears and causal structures. The toy, previously used in Schulz et al.
(2007), consisted of a 12”x12” cube with two metal pegs on top. Each
peg was designed to hold one 3″ diameter gear, such that two gears
would interlock when positioned on top of the toy. Sensors inside the
cube detected the presence of a gear on the pegs, causing them to spin
when a switch attached to the front of the toy was flipped to the ‘on’
position. A hidden control on the back of the toy allowed the experi-
menter to surreptitiously control the supply of power (which actually
determined whether or not the switch caused the gears to spin). A total
of six uniquely colored gears (blue, yellow, pink, green, red, orange)
were used: four during the training trials and two during the test trial.
Gear colors used for each part of the procedure were counterbalanced
across participants. Note that in our description of the procedure, we
refer to the gears using letters (A-F) in place of the color names that
were actually used to identify each gear during the experiment. The
picture cards (see Fig. 2) each depicted a cartoon illustration of either a
single gear (Fig. 2a) or a gear pair (Fig. 2c). These were used to
1 These structures were also based on Schulz et al. (2007), and were originally
referred to as ‘common cause’ and ‘causal chain.’ However, in the current ex-
periment, we to refer to them as ‘multiple cause’ and ‘single cause’ structures,
respectively.
E. Lapidow and C.M. Walker Cognition 201 (2020) 104315
3
illustrate the possible causal status (working or broken) and causal
structures (single or multiple causes) during the task. These illustrations
were identical to those used in Schulz et al. (2007), in which working
gears were represented with arms that allowed them to spin themselves
and/or other gears, while (cracked) broken gears did not. The illu-
strated gears were color-matched to the physical gears used on the toy.
2.1.3. Procedure
Each testing session began with the toy on the table in its powered
state, with the switch in the ‘off’ position, and two gears (A and B) in
place on the pegs. The experimenter introduced the toy, indicating the
switch on the front, and explained that it turned the toy on and off,
allowing the child to try both actions. When the child turned the toy on,
A and B would spin simultaneously, and when the child turned the toy
off, both stopped spinning simultaneously. The experimenter then re-
moved and replaced each gear in turn, explaining that, when turned off,
gears can be taken on and off the toy.
The experimenter then put A and B away, saying, “You're going to
get to see all the gears, but some of the gears are broken. When a gear is
broken, it doesn't spin, even when the toy is on, and it gets in the way of
other gears spinning too.” Children were then shown an example
working gear (A) and a broken gear (C) in turn. The experimenter
placed the gear on the right peg of the toy and the child observed it
either spinning (A) or not spinning (C) when the toy was turned on.
Each gear was paired with a matching picture card showing its causal
status. Using the pictures, the experimenter explained, “Gears that are
not broken can use their arms to spin themselves,” and, “Gears that are
broken don't have any arms, they cannot spin, and keep other gears
from spinning too.” The experimenter then held up A and C in turn and
asked the child to tell them, first, whether the gear was broken or
working, and second, whether it would spin on the toy on its own.
Children received feedback and, if necessary, correction on each re-
sponse. As part of the feedback for the second question, the experi-
menter placed the gear on the left peg of the toy and flipped the switch.
Thus, children observed that broken and working gears operate con-
sistently regardless of which peg of the toy they are on.
Each child then received training on the two causal structures,
presented as different combinations of gears: a multiple cause (C and D)
and a single cause (D and B) structure. The order in which the two
structures were presented was counterbalanced, as was whether the
broken gear (D) in the single cause structure was on the left or right peg
of the toy. For each structure, the experimenter placed both gears on
the toy and turned it on. The toy was always depowered, and the gears
always remained inert. The experimenter said, “The gears aren't spin-
ning. Something is wrong.” She then brought out a picture card de-
picting one of the possible causal structures and described it to the
child. For example, for the single cause structure, she said, “The picture
shows us that just one of the gears is broken. The D gear is broken and
doesn't spin on the toy, and the B gear is not broken so it can spin on the
toy. But when they're together, the D gear gets in the way of the B gear,
and nothing moves.” Each gear was placed on the toy individually, and
children were asked to predict (with feedback and observation) whe-
ther it would spin when the toy was turned on. This procedure was then
repeated for the other structure.
During the test trial, the picture cards used during the training were
left visible, one on either side of the toy. Gears E and F were placed on
the toy and did not spin when the toy was turned on. This time, how-
ever, the experimenter said, “I don't know what's wrong here. I don't
know why these gears aren't spinning. Will you help me figure it out?”
The experimenter then produced two picture cards, identical to those
seen during training, except that the depicted gears matched the colors
of E and F. These cards were placed adjacent to the matching card from
the training and each was described in the same terms. Children were
told that they had to figure out which of the two pictures correctly
showed why E and F weren't spinning together. Children were also told
that they would get a ‘clue’ to help them: they could choose to see how
one of the two gears (either E or F) would behave when the other gear
was removed and the toy was turned on.2 As noted above, only one of
these two options is informative, since it will either spin or remain
inert, depending on the true causal structure of the system. The unin-
formative gear, in contrast, is guaranteed to remain inert under both
possible structures. Thus, children are presented with a forced choice
between an informative and uninformative gear.
After indicating their choice to the experimenter, children were
allowed to remove the unselected gear, turn the toy on, and observe the
outcome. If the informative gear was selected, the outcome (spin or
inert) was counterbalanced, such that half of the children who selected
the informative gear would observe evidence for the single cause
structure, and the other half would observe evidence for the multiple
cause structure. Regardless of choice or outcome, the experimenter
would point to the gear when the toy was turned on and say, “Look!”
before holding up the two picture cards depicting the possible struc-
tures, and asking children to pick the one that showed how the gears
actually operated.
2.2. Results and discussion
Children's responses to all questions were recorded during the ex-
perimental session and videotaped. We recorded whether each child
chose to observe the informative or uninformative gear, as well as their
final judgment about the true causal structure of the gears. For the
subset of children who selected the informative gear, judgments were
further coded for whether or not they were consistent with the outcome
observed. Below, we report all statistics using both frequentist tests and
a Bayesian approach (expressed as Bayes factors [BFs], quantifying the
likelihood of the data under the alternative hypothesis compared to the
(2a) (2b) 
Inert 
Inert
(2c) 
Spin
Inert 
Fig. 2. Materials used in Experiment 1. (2a) Images used to illustrate ‘working’ and ‘broken’ gears. (2b) Schematic of gear toy. (2c) Images used to illustrate the
multiple causes (left) and single cause (right) structures with the behavior of each gear indicated by the arrows. The informative gear (in this case, the yellow gear) is
the one that behaves differently under each structure and can therefore distinguish between them. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
2 As an attention and comprehension check, half of children (n = 24) were
prompted to report the possible states of each gear before making their choice.
This had no effect on either the number of informative interventions (t
(46) = −0.62, p = .538 [ns]) or the number of correct causal inferences (t
(32) = 1.37, p = .18 [ns]), so the two scripts were combined for all analyses.
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null hypothesis).
A significant majority of children (70.83%) chose the informative
intervention, isolating and observing the gear that could disambiguate
between the possible causal structures, (p= .005, two-tailed binomial).
We also conducted a Bayesian analysis to obtain a full posterior dis-
tribution over parameter estimates, using a uniform prior, θ ~ Beta (1,
1). The Bayes factor, BF+0 = 23.775, 95% credible intervals: [0.57,
0.82], provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that children have a
preference for the informative gear. A logistic regression, treating age
as a continuous factor and choice of informative gear as the dependent
variable revealed no effects of age on performance (Wald, z = 0.756,
p < .450).
Furthermore, of the 39 children who observed this disambiguating
evidence,3 all but two made the correct causal inference (94.12%,
p < .0001, two-tailed binomial, BF10 = 874,961.507, 95% credible
intervals: [0.81, 0.98]). These results suggest that young learners are
not only sensitive to the informative potential of their own causal in-
terventions, but they are also able to apply the outcomes of those in-
terventions to accurately infer the causal structure of events in the
world.
3. Experiment 2
The results reported above provide evidence that young children
preferentially select and make accurate inferences from their own in-
formative interventions in the course of causal learning. This is con-
sistent with previous research on children's spontaneous exploration,
while also extending this work to show that this preference for in-
formative actions supports later inference. However, children's choice
behavior on this task is also amenable to the opposite interpretation. As
discussed above, the scientific reasoning literature often characterizes
early experimenters as ‘engineers’ (rather than ‘scientists’) who in-
correctly focus on generating effects (rather than information).
Since the informative gear in Experiment 1 was also the gear that
had the potential to spin when isolated by intervention, it is possible
that children did not select the informative action because it would
provide disambiguating evidence, but because it was more likely to
produce this desirable effect. If so, the preference for informative ac-
tions in Experiment 1 would actually be evidence in support of the
claim that young children's interventions are motivated by producing
effects, rather than learning about the world.
The second experiment tests this alternative interpretation. In
Experiment 2, we changed the operation of the gears to include gen-
erative causes (i.e., working gears cause broken gears to spin), rather
than inhibitory causes (i.e., broken gears prevent working gears from
spinning) (see Fig. 3). At test, children observed a pair of spinning
(rather than inert) gears that could be explained by appeal to either
multiple (both gears spin) or a single cause (only one gear spins,
causing the other to spin). Again, participants were given a forced
choice between two interventions to determine the true causal struc-
ture.
Critically, however, this presents a choice between an unin-
formative action (isolating the gear that works under both structures)
that is guaranteed to produce a desirable effect, and an informative
action (isolating the gear that works under one structure and is broken
under the other) that has equivalent odds of producing or failing to
produce the effect. This means that children must forgo the opportunity
to produce a desirable effect in order to acquire information about how
the causal system works.
If, as suggested by past work on exploratory play, children have an
intuitive preference for informative actions, then we should continue to
find a tendency to isolate and observe the disambiguating gear. If, on
the other hand, children show the opposite preference, choosing to
select the uninformative gear, then this would suggest they are moti-
vated by an ‘engineering goal’.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Forty-eight children (27 female, M = 64.9 months,
SD = 8.8 months, range = 48–81 months) were included in
Experiment 2. Recruitment procedures and demographics were iden-
tical to Experiment 1. Ten additional children were tested, but excluded
due to experimenter error (n = 3), sibling or caregiver interference
(n = 2), or failing to complete the entire testing session (n = 5).
3.1.2. Materials
Stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1. However, new
picture cards were created to depict the revised causal structures used
in Experiment 2.
3.1.3. Procedure
The task was similar to Experiment 1. However, the outcomes of
each action were modified in accordance with the revised definitions of
‘broken’ and ‘working’ gears. These changes are described below:
Children were initially told, “Some of the gears are broken. When a
gear is broken, it can't spin on its own. It needs a gear that's not broken
to make it spin.” When shown the example gears and pictures (Fig. 3),
working gears were described as able to “use their little arms to spin
themselves and to make other gears spin too.” Broken gears were de-
scribed as unable to spin by themselves. Instead, broken gears “need a
gear that's not broken on the toy with them to make them spin.”
In addition, the gear pairs were presented as operating according to
one of two structures: Either both the gears (E and F) are working and
can each spin on their own, or just one gear (E) is working, and “uses its
little arms” to spin F, causing both to move. As in Experiment 1, whe-
ther the broken gear in the causal chain was the right or the left gear of
the pair was counterbalanced across participants. All other procedures
and coding criteria remained the same.
3.2. Results and discussion
There were no significant age differences between the samples of
children tested in Experiments 1 and 2, t(94) = 0.25, p = .802 (ns).
Children again selected the informative intervention significantly
more often than expected by chance (66.67%, p = .029, two-tailed
binomial). Bayesian analysis, using a uniform prior, also supports the
hypothesis that children have a preference for the informative gear,
BF+0 = 5.041, 95% credible intervals: [0.54, 0.78]. Children's ten-
dency to make this choice was not significantly different from their
choice behavior in Experiment 1, (p = .527, two-tailed binomial), re-
plicating our previous findings. In other words, children continued to
privilege the informative action even when it was pit against an op-
portunity to produce a desirable outcome. Again, a logistic regression
revealed no effects of age on choice of the informative intervention
(Wald, z = 1.005, p < 0. 315).
Performance on the final inference question also did not differ from
Experiment 1. Of the 32 children who selected the informative gear, all
but one used this information to infer the causal structure that was
consistent with the observed outcomes of their interventions (96.88%,
p < .0001, two-tailed binomial, BF10 = 4,067,000, 95% credible in-
tervals: [0.84, 0.99]). These results provide evidence against the al-
ternative, ‘engineering goal’ explanation for children's success in
Experiment 1.
3 Although all children were asked to make a final inference, only those who
generated an informative intervention observed evidence that would support
further inferences that could be meaningfully classified as correct or incorrect.
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4. Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that children select in-
formative interventions, and use the outcomes of their own actions to
make accurate causal inferences. However, the study design leaves
open an alternative explanation for children's success. Specifically, the
picture cards used in both experiments to scaffold children's forced-
choice depict the informative gear in different states in each image
(spinning vs. inert), while the uninformative gear remains the same in
both images (spinning vs. spinning or inert vs. inert). These images may
have inadvertently provided children with a lower-level perceptual cue
that highlighted the uncertainty (or novelty) associated with the in-
formative gear. Furthermore, low-level ‘matching’ of the behavior of
the observed gear to the card image may have facilitated children's
selection of the correct causal structure. If so, children may have suc-
ceeded in Experiments 1 and 2 without any causal understanding.
Experiment 3 was therefore designed as a control task to remove all
superficial cues (see Fig. 4). To do so, children were asked to determine
the causal status of a single, unknown gear by choosing to pair it with
one of two known gears. Images were only used to introduce and ex-
plain the difference between broken and working gears, and could not
be used for low-level comparison or mapped to the outcome of inter-
ventions. Instead, selecting an informative action required under-
standing the causal properties of the system and potential outcomes
(and implications) of interventions on that system. In addition, Ex-
periment 3 introduced a pair of follow-up questions that required
children to extend what they learned from their own intervention to
determine the causal status of an entirely new, unknown gear. If chil-
dren's performance on this revised task parallels their performance in
Experiments 1 and 2, it would provide strong evidence of sophisticated
causal reasoning.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Forty-eight children (24 female, M = 64.2 months,
SD = 10.3 months, range = 48–81 months) were included in
Experiment 3. Children were tested in one of two conditions that
matched the causal rules presented in Experiments 1 and 2: an
Inhibitory condition (n = 24, M = 64.5 months, SD = 11.6 months,
range = 49–81 months) and a Generative condition (n = 24,
M = 63.8 months, SD = 9.2 months, range = 48–79 months).
Recruitment procedures and demographics were identical to those of
the first two experiments. Eleven additional children were tested, but
excluded due to experimenter error (n = 4), sibling or caregiver in-
terference (n= 2), machine malfunction (n= 2), or failing to complete
the entire testing session (n = 3).
4.1.2. Materials
The stimuli consisted of the machine, gears, and training images
(Fig. 2a) used in Experiments 1 and 2.
4.1.3. Procedure
Children were tested in one of two conditions. In the Inhibitory
condition, as in Experiment 1, broken gears prevent working gears from
spinning. In the Generative condition, as in Experiment 2, working
gears cause broken gears to spin.
The beginning of the procedure was identical to the previous two
experiments: The experimenter introduced the machine with two gears
(A and B) in place, explained the role of the switch, and then demon-
strated a working gear (C) and a broken gear (D). The operation and
explanation of these gears was identical to either Experiment 1 or
Experiment 2, depending on children's assigned condition. Again, these
gears were paired with a matching picture card that depicted their
causal status (broken or working, Fig. 4b) and children's understanding
was checked. However, unlike in the previous experiments, these
images and the two known gears remained visible throughout the rest
of the experiment.
Next, the experimenter proceeded to the test trial, presenting two
new, unknown gears (E and F). The experimenter said, “I don't know
how these gears work. I don't know if they're broken or not broken. Will
you help me figure it out?” The experimenter then moved gear F out of
sight, and placed gear E on one peg of the toy (Fig. 4a). Children were
told they had to figure out whether or not E was broken, and that they
would get a ‘clue’ to help them: They were allowed to choose one of the
two gears from the introduction (either C or D) to observe on the toy
Spin Spin
Spin Inert
Fig. 3. Illustration of the causal structures presented
in Experiment 2 with the behavior of gears under
each structure indicated by the arrows. Unlike
Experiment 1, the gear that is most likely to produce
a desirable outcome (in this case, the yellow gear) is
not informative. Children must be willing to forego
this option in order to conduct an informative in-
tervention (i.e., in this case, isolating the green
gear). (For interpretation of the references to color
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
Spin Spin 
Broken Working 
Inert Spin
(4d) (4c) 
Inert Spin 
Broken Working 
Inert Inert
(4a) (4b) Inhibitory Condition Generative Condition
Fig. 4. Design of Experiment 3. (4a) The gear toy is presented with an unknown gear (white) on one peg. (4b) Children are given the choice of placing one of two
known gears on the other peg: a working gear (top) or a broken gear (bottom). (4c-d) The pairing created by each choice and their possible outcomes (spin or inert),
depending on the true causal status (broken or working) of the unknown gear in Inhibitory (4c) and Generative (4d) conditions. The informative option is the one that
leads to different outcomes under each possibility and can therefore distinguish between them (i.e., the working gear in 4c and the broken gear in 4d).
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along with gear E to see how the two gears would behave together
when the toy was turned on. That is, they could choose to pair the
unknown gear (E) with either a working gear (C) or a broken gear (D).
As in the previous experiments, only one of these two possible inter-
ventions disambiguates between the two causal structures, which
varied by condition (i.e., the working gear (C) is informative in the
Inhibitory condition, and the broken gear (D) is informative in the
Generative condition). In both cases, the gear that is informative is the
one that will behave differently when paired with the unknown gear,
depending upon the unknown gear's causal status. The other gear will
behave the same regardless of the status of the gear it is paired with, and
is therefore uninformative (see Fig. 4c and d). Thus, if children apply
their causal understanding to determine those interventions that are
most informative, they should select the opposite gears in each of the
two conditions.
Following their choice, children made their selected intervention
and observed its outcome. As in previous experiments, the outcome
(spinning or inert) was alternated across participants who selected the
informative gear. Afterwards, children were asked to infer whether gear
E was broken or not, based on the evidence they generated.
Finally, to assess whether children could extend this newly acquired
causal knowledge to inform additional inferences, those who answered
correctly were also asked a follow-up question. The experimenter pre-
sented the other unknown gear (F), and used it to replace the in-
formative gear on the toy. Children were asked one of two questions
about this pair of gears, composed of the previously unknown gear (E)
and the currently unknown gear (F). One type of follow-up question
asked participants to make a prediction about whether E and F would
spin when the toy was turned on. The other type of follow-up question
asked participants to make an inference about the causal status of F
(working or broken), after observing E and F spin or remain inert (al-
ternated) when the toy was turned on. The type of follow-up question
asked varied according to the causal status of gear E that was observed
during the experiment (see Table 1).
4.2. Results and discussion
An analysis of variance showed no significant age differences among
any of the three experiments, F(2,141) = 0.205, p = .815 (ns).
Even after removing low-level cues, a significant majority of chil-
dren continued to select the informative gear (72.92%, p = .002, two-
tailed binomial), which did not differ from Experiment 1 (p = .87) or
Experiment 2 (p= .44). Bayesian analysis indicates strong evidence for
the hypothesis that children prefer the informative option:
BF+0 = 59.508, 95% credible intervals: [0.59, 0.83]. The numeric
difference in frequency of informative choices between the Inhibition
(79.16%) and Generative (66.7%) conditions matched the difference
between Experiments 1 and 2, and was similarly non-significant
p = .278. Logistic regression revealed no effects of age on choice of the
informative intervention (Wald, z = −0.639, p < .523).
Experiment 3 also supports and extends evidence for the claim that
children accurately utilize evidence generated through their own in-
terventions in subsequent causal inferences. First, we replicated chil-
dren's success on the initial question, with 32 of 35 children making the
correct causal inference following their own informative intervention
(91.43%, p < .0001, two-tailed binomial, BF10 = 145,826.92, 95%
credible intervals: [0.77, 0.97]). Additionally, children succeeded on
both types of follow-up questions, which required that they apply their
knowledge to inform either a novel prediction or inference. Of the 32
children who received a follow-up question,4 93.75% answered cor-
rectly (p < .0001, two-tailed binomial, BF10 = 262,400.25, 95%
credible intervals: [0.81, 0.98]). Looking at each type of follow-up
question in turn, 16 of 18 children made a correct prediction, and all 14
children made a correct inference. Taken together, the results of Ex-
periment 3 replicate and extend our previous findings.
5. General discussion
The current research sought to address two outstanding questions
about children's intuitive experimentation: (1) Do children successfully
identify and select informative interventions during exploration?, and
(2) If so, can they draw appropriate causal inferences based on the
outcomes they produce? These questions are critical, both for under-
standing the processes by which self-directed exploration contributes to
early learning, and to address the disconnect between the claim that
young learners are ‘intuitive scientists,’ and the claim that children are
unsuccessful scientific experimenters.
First, our results demonstrate that 4- to 6-year-olds not only prefer
to take informative interventions (Experiment 1), but that these actions
are not exclusively driven by their potential to produce desirable out-
comes (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, we replicate these results and
also rule out the alternative that children's success was due to their
reliance on a lower-level, non-causal strategy. These findings provide
evidence against previous ‘science vs. engineering’ account, which sug-
gests children are initially concerned only with the practical (and not
the informative) outcomes of their interventions (e.g., Schauble et al.,
1991; Siler & Klahr, 2012). While it is clear from prior work that the
desire to produce effects is one factor influencing children's choice of
actions (see Lapidow & Walker, 2020 for an explanation of this beha-
vior), the fact that young learners selected the informative action over
the productive action in Experiment 2 (and in the Generative condition
of Experiment 3) indicates that children's interventions are sensitive to
the epistemic goal of experimentation. The current study therefore goes
beyond past research on children's causal intervention (Meng et al.,
2018; McCormack et al., 2016) by providing direct evidence against the
claim that children select actions in order to ‘engineer’ effects.
Second, children in the current experiments made ready and accu-
rate use the outcomes of their own actions in novel causal inferences.
This goes beyond prior work showing that children make appropriate
inferences after observing the outcomes of experimenter-generated in-
terventions (e.g., Schulz et al., 2007; Sobel & Kirkham, 2006), and
contrasts with findings suggesting that children may be unable to draw
causal inferences from their own explorations (McCormack et al., 2016;
Meng et al., 2018). In addition, while previous research on exploratory
learning (e.g., Cook et al., 2011; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007) has shown
young children's preference for informative actions, the bulk of this
work has not required children to make subsequent causal inferences
from the outcomes of those actions,5 leaving it unclear whether and
how children utilize self-directed exploration to support their learning.
Table 1
Type of follow-up questions asked in Experiment 3.
Condition Children's Inference After Intervention Question Type
Generative Gear E is broken Inference
Gear E is working Prediction
Inhibitory Gear E is broken Prediction
Gear E is working Inference
4 Only children who correctly answered the initial inference question about
gear E were asked the follow-up question about gear F. This was done so that
children's performance on these additional questions reflects their ability to
extend their own causal inferences, rather than the experimenter's corrective
feedback, to novel instances.
5 Past work by Bonawitz et al., 2012 and van Schijndel et al., 2015 provides
some evidence for this ability in older children (4- to 7-year-olds and 4- to 9-
year-olds, respectively). However, both of these studies concerned improve-
ment in children's predictions about causal phenomena (balance and shadow
size) following their exploration of belief-inconsistent observations, not whe-
ther they make accurate inferences about causal structure from self-generated
evidence.
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Here, we provide strong evidence that children not only grasp the
causal implications of the data they generate; they also apply this
knowledge to inform their generalizations about novel causal variables.
Future work is needed to examine children's interventions and in-
ferences in more complex and contextualized learning problems. As
previously mentioned, the current task was designed to present a re-
latively simple causal system that does not rely on existing content
knowledge (Schulz et al., 2007). This method has limited resemblance
to real-world experimentation, in which the number of possible struc-
tures, interventions, and variables is often vast and uncertain. However,
having established early success in children's performance on a small-
scale, decontextualized problem, we can begin to investigate how these
behaviors are expressed in more realistic contexts. In particular, future
research should examine intervention and inference in causal systems
with a greater number of variables (e.g., Meng et al., 2018; McCormack
et al., 2016) and in domains in which learners hold prior beliefs (e.g.,
Schauble et al., 1995; Tschirgi, 1980).
To summarize, the current results demonstrate that young children
both preferentially select informative interventions, and make accurate
inferences from the outcomes they generate, during their own actions
on a novel causal system. These experiments fill a critical gap in the
well-worn proposal that early causal learning intuitively follows a
process that is analogous to knowledge acquisition in science. Our
findings further suggest that young learners' causal interventions and
inferences are sensitive to the principles of informative experimentation
long before they are able execute and articulate those strategies in ex-
plicit scientific reasoning tasks.
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